The careers of immigrants by Damas de Matos, Ana
  
ISSN 2042-2695 
 
 
 
CEP Discussion Paper No 1171 
October 2012 
The Careers of Immigrants 
Ana Damas de Matos 
 
 
    
Abstract 
I use a unique linked employer employee panel covering all wage earners in the private sector in 
Portugal to shed new light on the careers of immigrants. During the first ten years in the country 
immigrants close one third of the initial immigrant-native wage gap. I show that one third of this wage 
catch-up is accounted for by firm heterogeneity: Immigrants remain in the same occupations but get 
jobs with better paying _rms. Over time immigrants move to larger, more productive firms and with a 
higher share of native workers. These patterns are similar for all the recent immigrants irrespective of 
their origin and in particular of whether their mother tongue is the host country's language. Motivated 
by these new stylized facts, I suggest an economic assimilation mechanism which highlights 
imperfect information about immigrant productivity. I build an employer learning model with firm 
heterogeneity and complementarities between worker and firm type. The initial uncertainty over 
immigrants' productivity prevents them from getting access to the best jobs. Over time, productivity is 
revealed and immigrants obtain better firm matches. I derive predictions on the immigrant wage 
distributions over time, on their mobility patterns and on the productivity distribution of firms they are 
matched with. The predictions of the model are in line with the data and are not trivially derived from 
competing explanations. 
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1 Introduction
Over the past thirty years, the literature on the economic assimilation of immigrants has focused on
measuring the immigrant-native wage gap and the speed at which the gap closes with time spent in
the host country. According to Chiswick (1978) immigrants earnings' would equal and then exceed
the natives' after 10 to 15 years of residence. Although this estimate has been shown to be overly
optimistic, there is widespread evidence that immigrant wages catch up with the natives over time.
Duleep and Dowhan (2002) and Lubotsky (2007) in particular present evidence using longitudinal data
for the US.
A number of potential explanations for the wage catch-up have been proposed. Eckstein and Weiss
(2004) summarize the channels through which immigrants assimilate as follows: "With the passage
of time in the host country, immigrants invest in local human capital and search for better matches
with local employers, and employers become less uncertain of the immigrant's potential and realized
quality." Similar explanations are mentioned in Chiswick (1978), Borjas (2000) and LaLonde and Topel
(1997). This quote refers to three models of the distribution of earnings which may be used to explain
immigrant economic assimilation: a human capital, a search and matching and an employer learning
model.
Surprisingly no research has focused on studying the relative importance of these channels. In fact,
most empirical studies of immigrant wages start from a generic statement of the human capital model1
and focus mainly on measuring the immigrant catch-up rate. Within the human capital framework,
several contributions highlight the importance of dierent factors, such as speaking the host country
language (Chiswick and Miller (1995)), the age at arrival in the host country (Friedberg (1992)) or the
country of origin (Chiswick (1978),Borjas (2000)) in explaining the immigrant wage catch-up. How-
ever, no systematic attempt has been made to dierentiate between immigrant economic assimilation
channels.
This paper is a rst step to address this gap in the literature. I use a unique linked employer-
employee panel to study the early careers of immigrants in Portugal. The contribution of this paper is
two-fold. First, exploiting the richness of the data, I document new immigrant assimilation patterns in
the rst years in the host country. In particular, I show that job mobility and rm heterogeneity play an
important role in the assimilation process. Second, motivated by the stylized facts, I build an economic
assimilation model based on employer learning with rm heterogeneity and complementarities between
worker and rm type. I derive additional predictions from the model and show that they are in line
with the patterns in the data and that they can not be trivially explained by a search and matching
or human capital model.
I start the empirical analysis by measuring the immigrant wage catch-up rate. I document that
upon arrival immigrants earn 34% less than natives of the same age and 16% less than natives of the
1Borjas (2000) shows how dierent assumptions made on the human capital production function may lead to very
dierent predictions in terms of immigrant wage patterns. Few papers take the human capital model seriously to
investigate the mechanisms further. An exception is Eckstein and Weiss (2004) who assume an exogenous increase in
the returns to immigrants' skills and model the investment in human capital with time spent in the host country.
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same age working in the same region, industry and occupation. I show that the gap closes at a rate of
1 percentage point per year spent in the country. As I use a panel which covers virtually all workers in
the private sector, selection concerns are reduced. Estimates with and without individual xed eects
are very similar showing that selection is not a major concern in this context. This estimate of the wage
catch up is in line with the literature for the US. For instance, Lubotsky (2007), using longitudinal
social security data, shows that immigrants' earnings catch up with the natives at a rate of 10 to 15
percentage points in 20 years.
Accounting for immigrant sorting across regions, industries and occupations does not change the
estimated catch up rate signicantly. Immigrants do not assimilate by changing occupations and
moving to dierent industries. However, this paper shows that they do assimilate by switching rms.
In fact, the rst years in the country are characterized by a very high job mobility rate and one third of
the immigrant wage catch up is linked to moving to better paying rms. This nding relates to a small
but growing literature which measures how the sorting of immigrants across rms relates to the wage
gap between immigrants and natives. Evidence for Canada2 indicates that wage dierences between
rms are more important than dierences within rms in explaining the immigrant-native wage gap. I
build on this literature and show that moving to better paying rms is an important channel through
which immigrants move up the wage distribution.3
I then use the rich information in the data to focus more directly on the role of rms in the
assimilation process. Over time, immigrants move to bigger and more productive rms and get access
to longer term contracts. Immigrants tend to start their careers in rms with a high proportion of
immigrant workers and over time they move to rms with a higher share of native workers.
Moreover, I show that the wage catch up and rm mobility patterns are very similar for all the recent
immigrants irrespective of their origin and in particular of whether their mother tongue is Portuguese.
This result is at odds with a human capital accumulation explanation of the wage catch up. One would
expect immigrants who speak the language to suer a lower wage penalty to begin with but also to
catch up more slowly.
Motivated by this new set of empirical facts on immigrant careers, I suggest an economic assimilation
mechanism which highlights imperfect information about the productivity of immigrants. The model
presented is an employer learning model with rm heterogeneity and complementarities between worker
and rm type. It builds on the employer learning model by Farber and Gibbons (1996) and Lange
(2007). These models assume that rms are homogeneous and that workers are paid their expected
marginal productivity, which is independent of the rm they work for. I introduce rm heterogeneity
and an assignment mechanism to allocate workers to rms. The mechanism considered is similar to
the one in the dierential rents model presented in Sattinger (1993). Each rm hires one worker and
workers are assigned to rms according to their expected productivity given the information available
2See Aydemir and Skuterud (2008) and Pendakur and Woodcock (2009)
3Pendakur and Woodcock (2009) nd evidence that immigrants who have spent more years in the host country work
in less segregated and better paying rms than recent immigrants. However they are unable to rule out that this result
may be driven by dierences in characteristics of dierent cohorts of immigrants or by self-selection in out-migration. I
estimate the wage regressions with rm and worker xed eects, which allows to separate the eects.
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at the time. As there are complementarities between worker and rm productivity, workers with higher
expected productivity are assigned to more productive rms.4
The focus of the model is on the uncertainty: I assume that the only dierence between immigrants
and natives entering the labour market is that there is more uncertainty about immigrants' productivity
than about natives'. I consider this to be a reasonable assumption: Typically it is easier for employers to
judge the skills of a native than those of an immigrant. For instance, the evaluation of prior experience
and education is less straightforward in the case of immigrants.
In the model, rms produce subject to decreasing returns to skill and thus value certainty over
worker productivity. This prevents immigrants from getting access to the more productive rms in
the rst years in the host country. With time spent in the labour market, the uncertainty over worker
productivity decreases and workers get matched on average to more productive rms.
The predictions of the model on the mean wages and the job mobility patterns are in line with the
stylized facts. The learning model also has strong predictions on the evolution of the distribution of
immigrant wages over time, and in particular on the variance of wages. I take these predictions to the
data and study the variance of wages of immigrants and natives entering the market in the same year
over time. The variance of the log wages is higher for natives than for immigrants and increasing for
both groups over time. I show that rm heterogeneity accounts for a signicant part of the increase in
the variance of log wages. These results are in line with the predictions of the model.
Finally, I show that the results are not trivially derived from a competing search and matching or
human capital explanation.
Section 2 of the paper describes the data and presents some descriptive statistics on the immigrant
population. Section 3 documents immigrant assimilation patterns. In section 4, I present an employer
learning model with rm and worker heterogeneity and derive predictions on the distribution of im-
migrant wages. Section 5 compares the distribution of wages for immigrants over time against the
predictions from the model and section 6 discusses other possible assimilation mechanisms and how
they compare to the patterns in the data. Concluding remarks are presented in section 7.
4Two papers who combine complementarities in the production function and employer learning are Gibbons et al.
(2005) and Groes et al. (2010). The complementarity I am assuming is between worker and rm type, whereas in these
papers they refer to industry and worker type and occupation and worker type.
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2 Data and Descriptive Statistics
2.1 Data, Context and Sample Selection
Every year in November, rms registered in Portugal must hand in a detailed questionnaire (`Quadros
de Pessoal') to the Portuguese Ministry of Labour. This process is mandatory for all rms in the
private sector employing at least one wage earner. With the exception of the public service and
domestic workers, virtually all wage earners in the Portuguese economy are covered by the survey.
The questionnaire contains detailed information about the rm (the location, the volume of sales,
the industry, etc.), the establishment (the location, the number of workers, the collective bargaining
agreement, the industry, etc.) and the worker (age, gender, education, nationality, etc.). All workers,
rms and establishments have a unique identier which allows to track them over the years.
When a worker is not in the panel in a given year, it is impossible to distinguish whether he is
unemployed, working in the public sector or in the informal sector. In the case of immigrants, in
particular, when a worker drops out of the panel, it is impossible to know whether he has migrated to
the home country (or to a third country).
Portugal, like Italy, Spain or Greece, has been an emigration country for most of the last century
and this trend has only been reversed in the last 10 years. These traditional emigration countries are
now experiencing large inows of immigration. Net migration numbers between 2000 and 2007 are
striking: there are an additional 4.6m legal immigrants in Spain, 2.6m in Italy and close to half a
million in Portugal and Greece.5 In order to deal with the large inow of undocumented immigrants,
the Portuguese government organized an "extraordinary regularization" in 2001. The foreign legal
population in Portugal increased by 69% in that year. Approximately 183,000 individuals got a permit
to live in the country for a year. The permits were renewable up to four times. After ve years,
immigrants could apply for a long-term residence permit. Having a work contract in Portugal was the
main condition to obtain and renew a short-term residence permit. In 2003, bilateral agreements were
signed with Brazil which allowed Brazilian immigrants residing in Portugal before July 2003 to obtain
a long-term residence permit. Although there has been no major regularization programme since 2003,
immigrants may apply for a residence permit if they are in the country, have a work contract and are
registered with the social security.
I restrict the analysis to immigrants from the new immigration wave, that is immigrants who enter
the labour market after 2001. In 2000, only 0.5% of workers in the data are immigrants, in 2002
immigrants represent 4% of workers. The data set covers only workers in the formal sector. As there
is no direct information on the years immigrants have spent in the country, I build a proxy which
indicates the rst year the immigrant appears in the data, that is the rst year the immigrant has a
job in the formal sector. In all the analysis, the variable "years since migration", YSM, refers to years
in formal employment, and the "cohort" the immigrant belongs to is the rst year he is tracked in the
data.
5These numbers represent respectively 10.5%, 4.2%, 3.7% and 2.7% of the countries' total populations in 2007,
according to Eurostat.
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Figure 1 shows the mean hourly wages for the dierent cohorts of immigrants over time. The trend
in mean wages is similar for all cohorts. The 2002 cohort captures a high proportion of the immigrants
who took advantage of the 2001 regularization. These immigrants may have been working informally
in the country in the previous years.6 One may thus be concerned that this cohort is unusual. The
trend in mean wages of the 2002 cohort is nevertheless similar to the other cohorts which eases this
concern.
I use the information in the data on the workers' nationality to dene immigrants as foreigners. In
the short run naturalization is not an issue, since immigrants need at least six years of legal residence
to be able to apply for Portuguese citizenship.7
I restrict the analysis to immigrant men. Women represent less than 30% of immigrant observations
in the data and would need a separate analysis. Immigrant women in Portugal often get jobs as domestic
workers and are hence not covered in the data. I restrict the sample used to native and immigrant
men. In the 2002-2009 period, I follow the early careers of close to 120,000 immigrant men.
2.2 Descriptive Statistics
The immigrants considered in the data are divided into three main origin groups, representing more
than 90% of the total number of immigrant observations: Immigrants from Eastern and South Eastern
Europe (Eastern Europeans, in the text), Brazil, and the former Portuguese African colonies (Africa)8.
Graphics 2 and 3 illustrate the number of immigrants in the data each year; and the number of
immigrants who belong to each cohort, from 2002 until 2009. After the large increase of foreign legal
residents in Portugal in 2001, the number of immigrants continued to increase. With worsening labour
market conditions, the inow of immigrants slowed down after 2005 and the stock of foreigners in
the data actually decreased in 2006 and 2009. The representation of the main origin groups has also
changed over the years. Immigrants from Eastern Europe are the group which took greatest advantage
of the 2001 regularization (101,000 permits), in particular citizens from the Ukraine (65,000 permits)
and Moldova. The number of immigrants from Eastern Europe entering the country declined sharply
over the years and, as gure 2 shows, even the stock of Eastern European immigrants is in decline.
Brazilians started migrating later to Portugal, and by 2009 are the biggest of the three groups in terms
of new migrants. Since 2007 Brazil is the most common citizenship of immigrants residing legally in
Portugal. Immigrants from Africa are the oldest immigrant community in Portugal. Although this
group also beneted from the 2001 regularization, there has been immigration from Africa, mainly
from Cape Verde, since the 1980s. Until 2007 Cape Verdeans were the largest foreign community in
Portugal. The assimilation patterns of this group turn out to be slightly dierent from those of the
immigrants from the recent immigration wave.
Selected descriptive statistics of the data used are presented in table 1. Immigrants are younger
6Detailed information on the construction of the panel and the variables is in the appendix.
7Also, if an individual is foreign for ve years and then becomes Portuguese, he is considered to be an immigrant for
the analysis. More details on the construction of the panel are presented in the appendix.
8The exact denitions of the groups are in the appendix. Immigrants from the EU15 represent 4.5% of immigrant
observations and are excluded from the analysis.
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than the native population, and they have worked in Portugal on average just a little more than 3
years. Immigrant men are very concentrated in a small number of industries: construction by itself
accounts for more than 42% of the immigrant observations. Immigrants from dierent origin groups
select into dierent industries: 46% percent of the observations for men from Eastern Europe and
56% from Africa are jobs in construction, whereas for Brazilians the proportion is only 34%. Brazilian
immigrants are more likely to work in hotels and restaurants. Furthermore, immigrants from Eastern
Europe are more evenly spread in the dierent regions of the country, whereas immigrants from Africa
are very concentrated in the Lisbon metropolitan area where the traditional community has settled
since the 1980s.
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3 The Economic Assimilation of Immigrants
3.1 Measuring the Wage Catch-up
The main question in the immigrant assimilation literature is whether the gap in wages immigrants
experience upon arrival decreases with time spent in the host country. Following the literature, I
estimate equation (1) below by ordinary least squares. The log hourly wage of worker i in job j in year
t is given by:
ln(HW )ijt = FGi + Y SMit +Xijt + i + ijt (1)
The dependent variable is the worker's log hourly wage, FG is a dummy that indicates whether the
individual is an immigrant and Y SM are the years since migration. Y SM is set to 0 for natives. The
coecient  measures the immigrant-native wage gap and  the rate at which the gap decreases with
years since migration9. I measure the wage gap and the wage catch-up controlling rst only for a quartic
in age, and then progressively controlling for region, industry and occupation. This specication is
restrictive since it assumes that the returns to characteristics are the same for immigrants and natives
but nevertheless represents a useful benchmark.
The results for the dierent specications are presented in table 2. The mean hourly wage gap is
34:4% in the rst year and decreases by 0:9 percentage points with each year spent in the country.10
Adjusting by dierences in sorting across regions and industries reduces the initial gap to 24:5% and
accounting for occupational dierences reduces the gap still further to 14:6%. More than half of the
wage gap between natives and immigrants is due to dierences in immigrant sorting into dierent
regions, industries and occupations. The wage catch-up rate  however is very stable across speci-
cations. This result shows that the immigrant wage catch-up occurs within narrowly dened regions,
industries and occupations. In the rst years in the country, immigrants have higher wage growth than
natives of the same age. The catch-up is not correlated to immigrants moving to dierent industries
or occupations over time.
Cross-sectional calculations of the catch-up rate tend to over-estimate immigrant assimilation if
more successful immigrants have a higher probability of remaining in the host country and less successful
ones return to their home countries. I estimate all the specications with individual xed eects in
order to address the selection concern. The results are presented in the last three columns of table 2.
Controlling for individual xed eects also does not change the  signicantly which indicates that the
bias due to self-selection in out-migration is not a major concern in this context. Changing regions,
industries and occupations is part of the assimilation process. I therefore choose the specication
controlling only for a quartic in age and individual xed eects as my preferred specication. The
immigrant wage catch-up is set at 1 percentage point per year. This estimate is similar to the estimates
9Introducing higher order polynomials in YSM does not change the results. The eect of years in the country is close
to linear in the rst ten years in the country.
10The variable YSM is set to 1 in the rst year an immigrant is in the country so the initial gap is  0:353 + 0:009 =
 0:344
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for the US using panel data. Lubotsky (2007) evaluates the closing of the wage gap in the US at 10 to
15 percentage points in 20 years.
Next, I run the regressions separately for dierent origin groups. Table 3 presents the preferred
specication, which controls only for a quartic in age, with and without individual xed eects, for
the 3 main origin groups. The wage gap is similar for all origin groups. It is 6 percentage points lower
for Brazilians than for immigrants from Eastern Europe. The gap for immigrants from Africa lies in
between. After accounting for individual xed eects, the wage catch-up rate is slightly higher than 1
percentage point for Brazilians and Eastern Europeans but immigrants from Africa lag substantially
behind. These results show that speaking the host country language may not be as important as one
might have imagined for immigrant assimilation. Eastern Europeans are the only immigrants whose
mother tongue is not Portuguese, yet their wage growth is comparable to the one experienced by
Brazilians. The descriptive statistics show that immigrants from Brazil self-select into dierent sectors
and occupations than Eastern Europeans, but after this initial sorting the assimilation patterns are
very similar.
3.2 A Distributional Approach
The previous results establish that there is immigrant wage catch-up as measured by the mean hourly
wages. Comparing the whole distribution of log hourly wages of immigrants and natives shows that
the distribution of wages of immigrants is becoming more similar to that of the natives with time spent
in Portugal. Figure 4 illustrates this point. The graphic shows the representation of immigrant wages
in the distribution of native wages by years since migration, and more specically in the entry year,
after 5 years and 9 years in the country. For example, in the rst year in the country on average 33%
of immigrants earn less than the lowest decile of the native distribution. After 5 years in the host
country, less than 5% of immigrants do so. With years spent in the country, the distribution of wages
of immigrants widens and comes closer to the native wage distribution.
The calculations in this section use all cohorts and all years pooled together. One might worry
that the results are confounded by cohort eects and selection. To address this concern, I do the same
calculations for each cohort separately, for the whole cohort and for "stayers" only. I consider "stayers"
immigrants who can be tracked in the data each year. The graphics in gure 5 show the results for the
2003 cohort. Immigrants move up the wage distribution also when considering only "stayers" of the
same cohort. The results for all other cohorts and origin groups are similar and presented in the web
appendix.
These results show that over time immigrants move up the wage distribution. In the next sections,
I focus on a specic mechanism through which the catch up occurs: job mobility. I rst estimate a
linear probability model of job mobility; I then show that the wage catch up is linked to immigrants
moving to better rms; and nally I present descriptives on the rms that immigrants work for over
time.
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3.3 Immigrant Job Mobility
A very strong empirical regularity in the data is that the immigrant job mobility is very high. Table
4 presents results on a linear probability model of changing employers. The dependent variable is a
dummy that equals 1 if the worker-rm match will end in the next period, 0 if the worker is still
working for the same rm in the next period. Only workers who are in the data in two consecutive
years are considered in the analysis. On average 7% of native workers change employers in a given year.
The rate is much higher for immigrants : after the rst year in the host country, 26% of immigrants
change employers11. The probability of changing rms for immigrants decreases by approximately 2.1
percentage points per year. In specications (3) to (5) of table 4, I introduce other variables in the
model. In line with the literature on job mobility, eg. Farber (1999), I control for a cubic in tenure
and the current hourly wage in column (3), and account for dierences in sorting across regions and
industries (column (4)) and occupations (column (5)). Immigrants have on average lower tenure, lower
wages and work in dierent industries and occupations than natives. These dierences account partly
for the dierences in job mobility rates: there is nevertheless a remaining unexplained gap between
immigrants and natives.
3.4 The Role of Firms in Immigrant Assimilation
3.4.1 Introducing Firm Heterogeneity in the Wage Catch-up Estimations
Recent evidence from Canada12 indicates that the immigrant native wage gap is associated to immigrant
sorting across rms. Immigrants are not paid less than natives working in the same rm, but are
systematically concentrated in rms that pay less, holding worker and job characteristics xed. In
this section, I look at whether with time spent in the host country immigrants move to rms that pay
better, and if so, how much of the wage catch-up does this upward mobility account for.
I introduce rm heterogeneity in the wage equation estimated in the previous section in order to
investigate whether the immigrant wage catch-up is related to immigrants moving to better paying rms
over time. This estimation is a wage decomposition with individual and rm xed eects following
Abowd et al. (1999). This paper is the rst to present the AKM decomposition in the context of
immigrant assimilation. I thus augment equation (1) as follows13:
ln(HW )ijt = FGi + Y SMit +Xijt + i + j + ijt (2)
The estimation results are presented in table 5. Columns (1) to (3) reproduce the results from
table 2 controlling for individual xed eects. Columns (4) and (5) add rm xed eects. Column
(4) controls only for a quartic in age, whereas column (5) controls also for occupation. Comparing the
estimates for the main coecient of interest, the wage catch-up rate , with and without rm xed
11The variable YSM is set to 1 in the rst year an immigrant is in the country so the initial gap is 0:211 0:021 = 0:191
12The main papers are Aydemir and Skuterud (2008) and Pendakur and Woodcock (2009).
13I estimate this wage regression with two high dimensional xed eects using the algorithm presented in Guimaraes
and Portugal (2009) implemented in Stata through the command reg2hdfe.
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eects, gives us an idea of the role of rm heterogeneity in immigrant assimilation. Controlling for rm
xed eects, in addition to region and industry, decreases the estimated catch-up rate from 1 to 0.6
percentage points. In the estimations controlling also for occupations, the rate decreases similarly from
0.9 to 0.6 percentage points. When analyzing the importance of sorting across rms in the immigrant
wage gap, Pendakur and Woodcock (2009) show evidence that immigrants who have been in Canada
for 10 years or more work in higher xed eect rms than more recent immigrants. However, they can
not exclude that this result may be due entirely to selection. The estimations with rm and individual
xed eects indicate that moving to higher paying rms is indeed an important channel through which
immigrant wages catch up.
Table 6 shows the estimations for immigrants from the main origin groups. Comparing the estimates
with and without rm xed eects, the wage catch-up decreases from 1.3 to 0.9 percentage points for
Eastern Europeans, 1.1 to 0.8 percentage points for Brazilians and from 0.3 to -0.1 percentage points
for immigrants from Africa. Changing rms accounts for approximately one third of the wage catch-up
for Eastern Europeans and Brazilians. For immigrants from Africa, all of the observed catch-up occurs
by changing rms.
3.4.2 Immigrants Climb up the `Firm Quality Ladder' with Time Spent in the Host
Country
Not much is known about rms that hire immigrants and how immigrants progress in the rm "quality
ladder" with time spent in the host country. The previous section shows that immigrants sort into
low-wage rms and part of the assimilation process goes through switching to better paying rms. In
this section, I take a closer look at rms where immigrants work and at immigrant careers in the rst
years in the country from a rm perspective.
Figure 6 shows rm descriptives for rms where immigrants work over time. With years spent in
the host country, a higher proportion of immigrants gains access to long-term contracts. Immigrants
also become more integrated in the labour market: They start o their careers in rms with a very
large share of immigrant workers14, but are exposed to more native co-workers as time goes by. They
also move to larger rms.
Firm xed eects measure the rm wage premium, i.e., how rms in narrowly dened regions and
sectors reward individuals working in the same occupation dierently. The rm xed eects are often
thought of as a measure of rm productivity. Another more direct measure of rm productivity is
the rm's volume of sales per worker. The rm xed eects estimated in the previous section are
net of the individual xed eect. As a robustness check, I also estimate rm xed eects using the
same specication than in equation 2 but without individual xed eects. All measures of productivity
(volume of sales per worker and rm xed eects estimated with or without individual xed eects)
show similar patterns: over time, immigrants move to rms which are on average more productive.
The results for all immigrant groups are similar and are presented in the web appendix.
14For papers that analyze immigrant segregation in the workplace using linked employer-employee data see Andersson
et al. (2010) and Dustmann et al. (2011).
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One worry about these descriptive statistics is that they pool together all cohorts and do not deal
with selective out-migration. For instance, if only immigrants who start o their careers in more
productive rms remain in the country, the results would be driven exclusively by selection and would
not tell us much about the assimilation process. To address this concern, I do the same calculations
for all cohorts separately distinguishing between all the immigrants from a cohort and "stayers". The
means are rst calculated each year for all immigrants belonging to a certain cohort and then only for
immigrants who can be tracked in the data each year. The graphics for the 2003 cohort are presented
in gure 7. The graphics for all other cohorts are similar and are presented in the web appendix.
There is no initial dierence in the proportion of immigrants who hold long-term contracts comparing
immigrants who remain in the panel all the years and all the immigrants in the cohort. However,
as immigrants get long-term contracts, they become more likely to remain in formal employment in
Portugal, which explains the divergent trends between the two groups. All the other graphics suggest
a common analysis. Immigrants who stay in formal employment each year are the ones who start o
in larger, more productive and more integrated rms. In terms of assimilation, the important aspect
is that although the means are higher in levels for "stayers", the trends are in most cases parallel.
The detailed calculations allowing for cohort eects and selection conrm the overall interpretation
of the plots in gure 6. One of the channels of immigrant assimilation goes through moving to larger,
more integrated and more productive rms.
The descriptives presented above show that immigrants move up the wage distribution with years
spent in the host country labour market. A third of this upward mobility is linked to moving to rms
that are more productive and that pay higher wages. In the next section, I build a model of immigrant
economic assimilation based on rm heterogeneity and employer learning. When immigrants enter the
labour market, little is known about their true productivity. There are complementarities between
worker and rm type and rms value certainty over a worker's productivity. With high uncertainty
about their types, immigrants begin their careers at the bottom of the rm productivity distribution.
Over time, worker productivity is revealed and, on average, immigrants get better matches. I simulate
the model and show in the subsequent section that it can account for many qualitative features of the
data.
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4 A Learning Model with Firm and Worker Heterogeneity
4.1 The Workers and the Firms
Each worker has a productivity i. This productivity is composed of three additive terms:
i = qi + ai + si
The term q is observed for all workers as, for example, skills easily observed at a job interview. The
component a is unobserved for all workers and captures "true" ability or IQ. Finally, the term s is
observed for natives but not for immigrants as, for example the quality of a worker's education. All
three terms are independently drawn from normal distributions with means a, q and s and standard
deviations a, q and s. The independence of a with respect to q and s is a strong assumption but
common in the employer learning literature. The productivity  hence follows a normal distribution
with mean  = a + q + s and standard deviation  = (
2
a + 
2
q + 
2
s)
1
2 . In line with the employer
learning literature15, I assume the dierent components of worker productivity to remain unchanged
over time.
The productivity of rms in the economy is assumed to follow a log normal distribution with mean
c and standard deviation c.
16 The distribution of rms is taken as given in the model and is xed
over time. The productivity of each rm is known by all agents in the market and is constant over
time. Each rm hires only one worker and takes the wage schedule as given. The worker i - rm j
match at time t produces output:
yijt = cj [K   (exp ( (i + it)))]
where K is a large positive constant and it  N(0; ) is a random error to production.17 For a given
rm j, output is concave in the worker's ability i. The shape of the production function captures the
idea that the quality of the machine (the rm productivity) limits the productivity of the worker. This
production function ensures that the rm's expected output depends negatively on the uncertainty on
the worker's productivity which will be a key element in the allocation of workers to rms in the model.
4.2 The Learning Process
Each period, all employers observe a noisy measure of the worker's productivity, i + it, and update
their beliefs. There is symmetric learning: the current employer does not have more information about
the worker's productivity than other potential employers. What is learnt about worker i at time t is
15Farber and Gibbons (1996) or Lange (2007)
16For evidence on the skewness of the rm productivity distribution in the US, see Bartelsman and Doms (2000)
17Since  follows a normal distribution, there are workers who produce negative output. I choose m and K large
enough such that this fraction of workers is negligible.
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also independent of the worker-rm match. Agents observe yijt and make their update on
it    log

K   yijt
cj

= i + it
The noise is assumed to be independent of all other variables in the model and is the same for immi-
grants and natives.
The normality assumptions make the learning process easily tractable. After a worker has spent x
years in the labour market, the posterior distribution of worker i's type is a normal distribution with
mean x;k;i and standard deviation x;k, where k is an index for immigrant fg or native nat. The
expected productivity of an immigrant worker is:
x;fg;i =
2
x(2a + 
2
s) + 
2

(qi + a + s) +
2a + 
2
s
x(2a + 
2
s) + 
2

x 1X
l=0
il
and its variance is:
2x;fg =
2 (
2
a + 
2
s)
x(2a + 
2
s) + 
2

For a native worker:
x;nat;i =
2
x2a + 
2

(qi + a + si) +
2a
x2a + 
2

x 1X
l=0
il
and
2x;nat =
2
2
a
x2a + 
2

The expected worker productivity is a weighted average of the initial prior and the observed perfor-
mance on the labour market. Initially, the weight on the prior is higher for natives as the prior is more
precise. Over time the worker's expected productivity converges to the true productivity. The variance
of the posterior is higher for immigrant workers as there is more uncertainty about them. Over time,
the dierence between the two groups decreases and in the limit the variance of the posterior tends to
zero for every worker.
After x years in the labour market, the cross-sectional distribution of expected productivity for all
immigrant workers of the same cohort is a Normal distribution with expected value
E (x;fgjIx) = 
14
and variance18
V (x;fgjIx) = 2q +
x2(2a + 
2
s)
3
(x(2a + 
2
s) + 
2
 )
2
+
x2 (
2
a + 
2
s)
2
(x(2a + 
2
s) + 
2
 )
2
Similarly for natives, expected productivity for all native workers of the same cohort, x;nat, follows
a Normal distribution with expected value
E(x;natjIx) = 
and variance
V (x;natjIx) = 2q + 2s +
x2(2a)
3
(x2a + 
2
 )
2
+
x2 (
2
a)
2
(x2a + 
2
 )
2
Over time, the distribution of expected productivity becomes wider for both groups, while the mean
always stays the same. Due to the initial information asymmetry between natives and immigrants,
the distribution of expected productivity is always wider for natives. Over time, the two distributions
converge.
4.3 The Assignment Mechanism
The expected production of a rm j that hires worker i conditioned on all information available about
the worker after x periods in the labour market is:19
E (yijt) = cj

K   exp

 x;k;i + 1
2
(2x;k + 
2
 )

Firms prefer to hire workers with a higher risk-adjusted expected productivity x;k;i   122x;k. Within
a group and cohort, rms prefer workers with a higher expected productivity x;k;i. The term x;k
introduces a distortion across groups and cohorts: For a given expected productivity, rms prefer
workers for whom expected productivity is more certain. This introduces an advantage for older
cohorts and natives in the labour market.
For each cohort of natives or immigrants at each level of experience in the labour market, x;k  122x;k
follows a normal distribution with expected value
Mx;k = E

x;k   1
2
2x;kjIx

=    1
2
2x;k
and variance
Vx;k = V

x;k   1
2
2x;kjIx

= V (x;k)
18The calculation is in the appendix.
19This expression comes from the fact that exp( (i+ i;t)) follows a log normal distribution with mean exp( x;k;i+
1
2
(2x;k + 
2
 ))
15
The distribution of x;k   122x;k for all workers, immigrants and natives, of a given cohort after x
years in the market is hence a mixture of two normal distributions. The C.D.F. of this distribution is:
F (t) = p
0@ t Mx;fg
V
1
2
x;fg
1A+ (1  p)
0@ t Mx;nat
V
1
2
x;nat
1A
where  is the C.D.F of the standard normal distribution and p is the proportion of immigrants in the
cohort.
Assuming that each worker remains in the labour market for T periods, that all cohorts are similar
and that the proportion of immigrants is constant across years, the C.D.F. of the distribution of
x;k   122x;k for all workers in the market in a given year is:
F (t) =
TX
x=1
p
T

0@ t Mx;fg
V
1
2
x;fg
1A+ 1  p
T

0@ t Mx;nat
V
1
2
x;nat
1A
An ecient equilibrium at time t consists of an assignment of workers to rms and a wage schedule
that maximize expected aggregate output. In such an assignment, each period workers are matched to
rms according to the worker's risk-adjusted expected productivity and the rm's productivity. Worker
i is assigned to rm j with productivity cj

x;k;i   122x;k

, such that
G

cj

x;k;i   1
2
2x;k

= F

x;k;i   1
2
2x;k

where G is the C.D.F. of rm productivity. This assignment means that workers and rms are matched
by their relative position in the probability distributions. In a discrete setup, this would mean that
the nth worker, in order of decreasing expected worker productivity, will be employed by the nth rm,
in order of decreasing rm productivity. This has to hold in an ecient equilibrium and follows from
the rm-worker complementarity.
In this setup there is no need to solve a dynamic problem as every period the distributions of rms
and workers' expected productivity are the same and there are no moving costs. Each period there
is a new equilibrium based on all available information. Facing a wage schedule w(z), where z is risk
adjusted worker productivity, rm j maximizes expected prots:
max
z

cj

K   exp

 z + 1
2
2

  w(z)

The rst order condition implies that the expected marginal product must equal the marginal increase
of the wage.20 In equilibrium, this is only true for the proposed assignment, so I can write:
w0(z) = b c(z) exp( z)
20The second order condition holds, since the cross-derivative of expected production is positive. See Sattinger (1993).
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where b = exp
 
1
2
2


is a constant. The wage schedule in the economy can be found by integrating this
expression:
w(x) = b
Z x
A
c(z) exp( z)dz
where A is the minimum worker productivity. Since there exists no closed-form solution for the optimal
rm match c(z), no explicit solution for the wage can be found. In the following subsection, the model's
predictions on the moments of the wage distribution will thus be derived by simulation.
The shape of the wage schedule is governed by decreasing returns to skill, captured by exp( z),
and the match function c(z). Decreasing returns alone would make the wage schedule concave. This
is counteracted by the equilibrium assignment, according to which better workers work at better rms.
Depending on the rate at which the optimal match function increases, the wage schedule can be locally
convex or concave, but is in all cases increasing in worker productivity. The graphics in gure 8 plot
the optimal rm match c(z) and the wage w(z) as a function of worker risk-adjusted productivity
z = x;k;i  122x;k. For the parameters chosen, the rm match function is strictly convex. In general, its
exact shape depends on the parameters of the underlying skill and productivity distributions of workers
and rms. In particular, the convexity of c(x) is related to the skewness of the rm productivity
distribution. If the rm productivity distribution is heavily right-skewed, then a marginal improvement
in worker skill is associated with an increasingly better rm match, thus making the optimal match
function convex.
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5 Comparing the Predictions of the Model to the Data
In this section, I derive predictions from the model presented in the previous section on the distribution
of wages and on job mobility patterns. I rst show that the predictions on the immigrant mean wage,
mean rm productivity and job mobility over time are in line with the stylized facts of section 3. I
then take the additional prediction of the model on the variance of wages to the data.
The model does not have a closed form solution for the optimal worker rm match as c is the
inverse of the C.D.F. of a log normal distribution. I therefore simulate the model. There are 600,000
workers who each spend 30 periods in the labour market and immigrants represent 10% of workers in
each cohort.
5.1 The Predictions of the Model and the Stylized Facts
In the empirical analysis in section 3, I highlighted three main stylized facts about the immigrant wage
catch-up:
1. Immigrant wages catch up to the wages of natives of the same age group
2. In the rst years in the country, immigrants exhibit high job mobility rates which decrease over
time
3. Part of the immigrant wage catch-up is explained by immigrants moving to better paying and
more productive rms
In this rst section, I show how the model accounts for these stylized facts.
5.1.1 The Mean Firm Productivity and the Mean Wage over Time
In the model, the distribution of the risk-adjusted expected productivity for a cohort of immigrants
moves to the right and becomes wider over time: the right-shift in the distribution is due to less
uncertainty about immigrant true productivity: 2xk decreases. The widening of the distribution comes
from employer learning about each worker's true productivity.
Mean Firm Match: As rms reward certainty over the worker's productivity, new entrants on
the market are matched to less productive rms on average. Among new entrants, immigrants have
a higher uncertainty than natives and hence occupy on average the bottom of the rm productivity
distribution. Over time, uncertainty decreases and workers gain access to better rms. This eect shifts
the distribution of their rm matches to the right and hence increases the mean rm productivity over
time. This eect is stronger for immigrants than for natives of the same cohort as there is more to
learn about immigrants.21
21If the match function c(x) is convex, as in the present simulation, there is another eect on the mean rm match:
as true worker productivity is revealed, and the variance of the expected productivity distribution of a cohort rises, the
mean match increases. However, as explained earlier, the local convexity of c(x) depends on the exact parameter values
chosen. This eect is second-order relative to the shift of the worker productivity distribution.
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Mean Wage: The reduced uncertainty about productivity also improves immigrants' wages
through two main eects. First, as described above, they gain access to better rms, thus increasing
their marginal product. Second, their expected marginal product increases due to reduced uncertainty:
exp( xki + 122xk) declines. Job mobility thus accounts for only a part of the total wage gains in the
model.22
The model also predicts an increase in the mean of the log rm match and the mean of the log
wage for an entering cohort of workers. The same mechanisms that increase the mean wage and the
mean rm match also lead to increases in the log of these variables.23
The graphics of gure 9 show the mean log rm productivity and the mean log wage for an entry
cohort of immigrants over time. The left hand side graphics compare an entry cohort of immigrants to
natives of the same cohort, and the right hand side graphics compare an entry cohort of immigrants to
the whole native labour force. The mean log wage of immigrants is increasing and part of the increase
is due to rm heterogeneity. Comparing immigrants and natives of the same cohort, the mean log wage
is initially higher for natives as they start their careers in better rms. Over time, the mean log wage
for both groups increases, more so for immigrants as there is initially more uncertainty about their
productivity.
The model thus generates predictions that are consistent with the rst and third stylized fact of
the data: On average, immigrants catch up to natives of the same age group, and part of this catch up
is accounted for by moving to better rms. To sensibly derive predictions on job mobility, a variant of
the model is discussed in the next subsection.
5.1.2 Job Mobility
The assignment model presented above has very strong continuity assumptions and a restrictive one
to one match. This way of modeling allows to solve explicitly for the optimal worker-rm match and
hence to simulate the patterns of the rm productivity distribution over time. In this continuous
version of the model, all workers move jobs every period as information is revealed. In order to make
the predictions on job mobility more realistic, I make a small change to the model above and assume
that there is a nite number of rms, and that each has a xed number of jobs. Firms are ordered
by their productivity level: 0 < c1 < c2 < :: < cm. All the other ingredients of the model remain the
same.
As before, an equilibrium is dened by an assignment of workers to rms and a wage schedule.
I can dene m   1 worker risk-adjusted expected productivity thresholds, lj , so that workers with
risk-adjusted expected productivity x;k   122x;k 2 [lj ; lj+1] are assigned to the rm of productivity cj .
The wages are derived in the same way as in the model above. I assume that there are no moving costs.
Workers switch rms when their risk-adjusted expected productivity is revealed to be much higher or
22Again, the local curvature of the wage function together with the increasing variance of the expected productivity
distribution exerts a second order eect on mean wages.
23Since the log wage function is concave the second order eect of an increasing variance of expected productivity now
depresses the mean log wage.
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much lower than expected - that is, when their expected productivity crosses a threshold lj .
24
Comparing immigrant and native workers, the model yields a main prediction: Immigrant workers
switch rms more often than natives do, but the dierence in job mobility between the two groups
decreases over time. There is initially more uncertainty about immigrant productivity and more up-
dating for immigrants each period. The dierence between the two groups decreases over time as extra
information each period represents a smaller and smaller part of all information available about the
worker. This prediction is in line with the stylized fact on immigrant job mobility from section 3.
Immigrants move jobs more often than natives but at a decreasing rate.25
5.2 Taking an Additional Prediction of the Model to the Data
5.2.1 The Variance of Wages over Time
The model considered is an employer learning model and as such generates clear predictions on the
second moment of the wage distribution. In this section, I show that the model predicts an increase in
the dispersion of wages for immigrants over time and that this increase arises through switching rms.
Variance of Wages: As worker productivity is revealed, the distribution of expected productivity
for a cohort of workers widens over time. This eect increases the variance of wages since workers
are paid according to their expected marginal product. In the present model, this eect is magnied
by worker assignment to heterogeneous rms. As the distribution of expected productivity widens
over time, so does the distribution of rm productivity workers are matched to. If the c schedule is
convex, then the dispersion of rm productivity will further increase due to a second eect: As new
entrants move up the rm-quality ladder, they gain access to increasingly better rms. This is related
to the underlying skewness of the rm productivity distribution. The distribution of assigned rm
productivity for these workers widens and further contributes to the increase in the variance of wages.
According to the model, we should thus see an increasing prole of the variance of log wages26 for a
cohort over time and this increase arises in the model through switching rms. If we consider a model
with a nite number of rms, not all of the increase in the variance of wages is related to switching
rms: the dispersion of immigrant wages increases even within the same rm as employers learn about
worker productivity.
In the next section, I conduct an empirical analysis of the variance of log wages for immigrant and
native workers entering the labour market between 2002 and 2009 in order to take this prediction to
the data.
24The distribution of the changes in risk-adjusted expected productivity for a cohort over time is derived in the
appendix.
25The model considered is silent on the eect of tenure. A possible way to introduce the impact of tenure is to add
accumulation of employer specic human capital. This generates moving costs which depend on the rm productivity.
Solving for the extended model implies solving for a dynamic equilibrium instead of the stable equilibrium in the previous
section.
26The increase in the variance of wages will also raise the variance of log wages. In the present simulation, this eect
dominates the eect coming from the higher mean of wages, which depresses the variance of log wages.
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5.2.2 The Variance of Wages in the Data
I start by estimating equation (3) below by ordinary least squares:
ln(HW )it = origini  cohorti  yeart + it (3)
The variable origin is a dummy for each origin group: native, Brazilians, Eastern Europeans,
Africans and other immigrants; cohort is a dummy variable for each entry cohort from 2002 until 2009;
and year denotes a dummy for calendar year, from 2002 until 2009. This specication is a more general
form of the specication used in section 3. The aim is to estimate the dispersion of the wages net of all
mean eects. The residual estimated from this regression represents the part of the log wages which is
not explained by the evolution of the mean log wages of workers from a given group and cohort over
time.
The graphics in gure 11 plot the variance over time of the residuals estimated for natives and
immigrants of the 2003 cohort under dierent specications. I focus on the 2003 cohort as an example,
the same analysis is conducted for all other cohorts in the web appendix. The rst plot uses the
specication of equation (3), the following plots add controls rst for age groups, region and industry;
then occupations; and nally rm xed eects.
The variance of log wages is higher for natives than for immigrants and it is increasing over time for
both groups. This stylized fact holds true independent of the exact specication considered. Controlling
for region, industry and occupation explains part of the dierence in the level of the variance of log
wages between natives and immigrants. Immigrants have more undierentiated log wages because they
sort into more similar industries and occupations than natives. However, the increase in the variance
proles over time remains the same. Controlling for rm heterogeneity has a dierent eect. The
increasing variance prole of immigrants and natives is attened when rm heterogeneity is taken into
account. I interpret this eect as evidence that new entrants on the market sort through changing
rms. This eect is particularly strong in the rst years in the labour market.
Figure 12 presents the same results but restricting the sample to workers from the 2003 cohort who
are in employment every year. The patterns are very similar to those in gure 11 which shows that
selection out of the labour market does not have an eect in these estimations. The results are similar
for all cohorts and origin groups. This is shown in the web appendix.
The stylized facts are in line with the predictions of the model on the variance of log wages. The
variance of log wages is higher for natives than for immigrants as initially more is known about native
productivity. Natives have a higher variance of expected productivity and gain access to a wider
range of rms. The variance of log wages is increasing over time for all new entrants in the market.
As productivity is revealed, workers are sorted and work at more diverse rms. This mechanism is
consistent with the stylized fact that rm heterogeneity explains part of the increase in the variance of
log wages.
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6 Competing Theories of the Distribution of Wages
6.1 The Learning Model with Firm and Worker Heterogeneity
The model of the distribution of wages presented in section 4 is a model in which the type of workers is
unknown and as productivity is revealed workers are assigned to more productive rms. The predictions
of the model are consistent with the empirical analysis presented in section 5. The mean wages and
the variance of wages are increasing over time. Both of these eects are partly explained by switching
rms and the probability of switching rm decreases over time.
To model the dierence between natives and immigrants, I assumed that there is initially more
uncertainty about immigrant productivity than native productivity. Two stylized facts are in line with
this assumption: immigrants switch rms more often than natives; and the variance of wages is higher
for natives than for immigrants.
An additional prediction from the learning model is that the variance of the changes in expected
productivity of workers of the same cohort declines over time. With time spent in the labour market
there is progressively less to be learnt about the worker's productivity. This is the mechanism which
leads to the decrease in job mobility over time. Initially, as there is more uncertainty about immigrants,
the variance of the changes in expected productivity is higher for immigrants than for natives. The
variance decreases for both groups over time but faster for immigrants than for natives.27 In order to
investigate this prediction, I rst estimate the following equation with ordinary least squares:
ln(HW )it = origini  cohorti  yeart + it (4)
This equation is similar to the one used to estimate the variance of log wages in the previous
section. I calculate the variance of the residual for immigrants and natives for each cohort, each year.
I consider in this calculation only "stayers", that is workers who remain in employment every year. I
then estimate the following regression by weighted least squares:
V ar(^lt) = FGl + EXPl + FGl  EXPl + yeart + lt (5)
l refers to a origin-cohort (for ex. natives belonging to the 2003 cohort), t refers to calendar time.
Table 7 presents the estimations. The variance of the wage growth is on average higher for immigrants
than for natives and decreases for both groups over time. I interpret the fact that the variance of
the wage growth is higher for immigrants than for natives as evidence of the higher uncertainty over
immigrant productivity.
In the next sections I consider two competing models of the wage distribution and investigate
whether they match the stylized facts on immigrant economic assimilation. Table 8 compares the
predictions of the three competing explanations to the stylized facts.
27The distribution of the changes in risk-adjusted expected productivity for a cohort over time is derived in the
appendix.
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6.2 Search Model
A competing model of the distribution of wages which may be useful in the context of understanding the
immigrant wage catch up is a search model. This class of models departs from the perfect competition
framework and introduces search frictions. Workers need time to receive wage oers, and as they do,
they climb up the wage distribution. I assume the dierence between immigrants and natives to be
that immigrants have less "search capital" upon arrival in the country and over time they receive wage
oers at an increasing frequency.
In order to be more specic, let us consider a simple search model: The distribution of wages is
exogenous, workers get wage oers from a wage distribution with C.D.F F . Oers arrive at a rate (x).
If the new wage oer is higher than the current wage the worker switches jobs, if not he remains with
the same employer. This model is a simple on the job search model as for instance Burdett (1978). I
abstract in this simple model from unemployment. Workers remain in employment all periods. When
taking the predictions of the model to the data I consider only "stayers", that is, workers of an entry
cohort who are always in employment. The dierence between immigrant and native workers in the
model is then modeled by a dierent arrival rate of wage oers. Immigrants are assumed to have
initially lower search capital, fg(0) < nat(0), but the rate of arrival increases faster for immigrants
than for natives 0fg(x) > 
0
nat(x).
According to this simple model, the mean wages of workers of a cohort increases and the increase
is due to switching rms. All workers move up the wage distribution as they receive more wage oers
over time. Workers also switch rms at a decreasing rate with time spent in the labour market. As
workers move to better rms, the probability of receiving a better oer decreases over time. These two
predictions are in line with the patterns in the data for new entrants. However, another prediction of
the search model is that the distribution of wages of a cohort over time becomes truncated to the left.
Workers who started o in the worse jobs move up over time, faster than the workers who started with
a higher relative wage. This mechanism implies that the variance of wages of a cohort decreases over
time.28
Figure 13 shows a simulation of the mean and variance of the log wages and wage growth of the
model above for an entry cohort in the labour market. In this simulation, the probability of receiving a
wage oer each period is constant and set equal to 0.1. The mean wage is increasing and the variance
of wages is decreasing with time spent on the market. The exact shape of the curves depends on the
assumption on the arrival rate (x) but these two results hold for all cases. A decreasing variance of
wages is in contradiction with the patterns in the data for new entrants in the market, immigrants and
natives. Independently of the precise assumption on the dierence between immigrants and natives
entering the labour market, a simple search model is not compatible with the increase in the variance
of wages for "stayers" over time, as documented in section 5.
28This prediction on the monotonicity of the variance of wages only holds when considering only workers who remain in
employment every year. The model is the same than the one in Manning (2000), however he nds that the patterns of the
variance of wages are non-monotonic: this is due to the eect of workers who accept a job oer after an unemployment
spell.
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6.3 Human Capital Model
Another competing model is based on human capital accumulation.
Let us consider the following setup: There are complementarities between worker skill and rm
productivity, as in the model above. Over time, workers accumulate human capital and become more
productive. A possible assumption to model the dierence between natives and immigrants is that
immigrants have an initial lower level of human capital but that they accumulate human capital in the
rst years in the host country faster than natives. Let us assume also that the human capital function
is concave: there are decreasing returns to investment in human capital.
New entrants in the market start o at the bottom of the rm distribution since they have the
lowest levels of human capital. Over time, as their human capital stock increases, they gain access to
better rms and the mean wages increase. As the productivity of workers increases at a decreasing
rate, the job mobility rate decreases over time. The prediction on the immigrant wage catch up and
on job mobility are the same than those in the model of section 4.
To derive predictions on the variance of wages, an extra assumption is needed which is that workers
accumulate human capital heterogeneously. This implies that as workers accumulate human capital,
the wages of a cohort become more dispersed. The variance of the wage growth also decreases over
time as there are decreasing returns to human capital accumulation.
As this specic example illustrates, a human capital model can explain any set of stylized facts,
if the appropriate assumptions are made. It is therefore not really testable. Distinguishing between
heterogeneous accumulation of human capital and learning is an unsolved problem in the literature,
and goes beyond the scope of this paper.
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7 Conclusion
Although there is widespread evidence that immigrant wages catch-up to the wages of comparable
natives with years spent in the host country, the mechanisms through which wages catch-up are not
well understood. I use a unique linked employer employee panel for Portugal to study the careers of
immigrants in the rst years in the host country. The data allows following all workers in the private
sector in the country and provides detailed information on the rms.
I show that immigrant wages catch up to the natives of the same age at a rate of 10 percentage
points in 10 years. Immigrants exhibit very high job mobility rates and one third of the wage catch-up
is associated to moving to better paying rms. Sorting across occupations explains a large part of the
immigrant-native wage gap but changing occupations does not contribute to the catch-up. Over time,
immigrants move to bigger, better paying and more productive rms. They tend to start their careers
in segregated rms but the share of native co-workers increases as time goes by. The proportion of
immigrants with a long term contract also increases with years spent in the labour market.
Motivated by these new stylized facts, I suggest a model of immigrant economic assimilation which
highlights the role of uncertainty about immigrant productivity. Workers and rms are heterogeneous
and rms value certainty over worker productivity. The model predicts that immigrants start their
careers in the host country working in low productivity rms. Over time, they get access to more
productive rms and move up the wage distribution. I derive additional predictions from the model
on the variance of wages. In line with the model, immigrant wages become more dispersed with time
spent in the host country and the increase in dispersion is associated with rm heterogeneity.
Finally, I consider two competing explanations of the immigrant wage catch-up: search and human
capital accumulation. The predictions on the evolution of the variance of wages of immigrants from a
simple search model are not in line with the patterns in the data. A human capital accumulation model
with heterogeneous agents may be consistent with the data. Distinguishing between the predictions
from a learning model and from a human capital model with heterogeneous agents is an unsolved
problem in the literature, which is beyond the scope of this paper.
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Figure 1: Mean Hourly Wages for Immigrants by Cohort
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Figure 2: Number of Immigrant Workers in the Data
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Figure 3: Region of Origin of Immigrants by Cohort
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Figure 4: Representation of Immigrant Wages in the Distribution of Native Wages by Year since
Migration
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Note: The graphic illustrates the representation of immigrant wages after 1, 5 and 9 years in the
country in the native wage distribution. With years spent in the country, the distribution of wages of
immigrants comes closer to the one of the natives.
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Figure 5: Representation of Immigrant Wages in the Distribution of Native Wages by Years since
Migration, 2003 Cohort
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Note: The top graphic is for all immigrants of the 2003 cohort and the bottom one is for immigrants
of the 2003 cohort who remain in the data every year the "stayers". The comparison group is natives
who are in the data in 2003 and natives who are in the data in 2009.
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Figure 6: Climbing up the 'Firm Quality Ladder'
.
2
.
3
.
4
.
5
.
6
Lo
ng
 T
er
m
 C
on
tra
ct
0 2 4 6 8 10
Years since Migration
Mean Prop. of Immigrants whith a Long−term Contract
.
35
.
4
.
45
.
5
.
55
Sh
ar
e 
of
 Im
m
ig
ra
nt
s
0 2 4 6 8 10
Years since Migration
Mean Share of Immigrants among the Firm’s Employees
22
0
24
0
26
0
28
0
30
0
32
0
Fi
rm
 S
ize
0 2 4 6 8 10
Years since Migration
Mean Firm Size
50
00
0
60
00
0
70
00
0
80
00
0
90
00
0
10
00
00
Fi
rm
 P
ro
du
vt
ivi
ty
0 2 4 6 8 10
Years since Migration
Mean Firm Productivity
−
.
15
−
.
1
−
.
05
Fi
rm
 F
ix
ed
 E
ffe
ct
0 2 4 6 8 10
Years since Migration
Mean Firm Fixed Effect
−
.
06
−
.
05
−
.
04
−
.
03
−
.
02
−
.
01
Fi
rm
 F
ix
ed
 E
ffe
ct
0 2 4 6 8 10
Years since Migration
Mean Firm Fixed Effect, 2FE
33
Figure 7: Climbing up the 'Firm Quality Ladder', 2003 Cohort
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Figure 8: An Employer Learning Model with Firm and Worker Heterogeneity
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Note: The plots of the expressions derived in the model are drawn setting all means equal to 0,
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Figure 9: Predictions on the Mean Log Firm Productivity and the Mean Log Wages
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Figure 10: Predictions on the Variance of Log Firm Productivity and the Variance of Log Wages
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Figure 11: The Variance of Log Wages
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Notes: The plots represent the variance of the residual by year and cohort for all natives and immigrants
of the 2003 cohort estimated by least squares from the following specication:
ln(HW )ijt = origini  cohorti  yeart + it, and controlling progressively by age group and industry
(top right), occupation (bottom left) and rm heterogeneity (bottom right).
The variance of log wages is higher for immigrants than for natives and increasing for both groups over
time. Firm heterogeneity explains the increase in the variance in particular in the rst years in the
labour market.
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Figure 12: The Variance of Log Wages, Stayers
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Notes: The plots are the same than those in gure 11 but consider only workers from the 2003 cohort
who remain employment each year. The patterns are very similar, which show that selection out of
the labour market does not aect the results.
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Figure 13: Predictions on the Mean and Variance of Wages of a Search Model
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Notes: The plots represent the patterns of the mean and variance of log wages and wage growth for
an entry cohort. Workers are assumed to stay in employment every period. The probability to receive
a wage oer in any given period is set to 0.1.
The decrease in the variance of wages of a cohort over time is not compatible with the stylized facts
in section 5.
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Table 1: Population Selected Means
Natives All Immigrants East. Europ. Brazil Africa
Age 38.7 35.1 36.6 32.6 35.3
YSM 0 3.3 3.6 3.0 3.2
By Origin
East.Eur. 0 0.49 1 0 0
Brazil 0 0.22 0 1 0
Africa 0 0.20 0 0 1
By Region
Alentejo 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.02
Algarve 0.04 0.14 0.19 0.11 0.08
Centro 0.22 0.18 0.26 0.15 0.07
Lisboa 0.29 0.49 0.32 0.55 0.77
Norte 0.40 0.13 0.16 0.13 0.06
By Industry
Manufacturing 0.31 0.16 0.24 0.12 0.06
Construction 0.18 0.42 0.46 0.34 0.56
Wholesale and retail trade 0.19 0.10 0.08 0.13 0.07
Hotels and restaurants 0.04 0.09 0.04 0.18 0.06
Transport, storage 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.02
and communication
Real estate, renting 0.09 0.13 0.09 0.13 0.19
and business activities
Number of Workers 117,964 47,279 34,913 23,810
Number of Observations 8,506,801 339,986 152,008 89,001 65,977
Notes: This table shows the mean age for natives and immigrants of the three main origin groups and the "years since
migration" (YSM) for immigrants; the distribution of immigrants by origin; and the distribution of immigrants and
natives by region and industry. Only recent immigrants who have entered the labour market after 2001 are considered
in the analysis. All the dierences in means between groups are very signicantly dierent from 0.
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009.
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Table 2: Immigrant Wage Catch up
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
FG -0.353 -0.254 -0.152
(0.0012) (0.0012) (0.0011)
YSM 0.009 0.009 0.008 0.010 0.010 0.009
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Age (quartic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes
N 7,543,209 7,543,209 7,543,209 7,543,209 7,543,209 7,543,209
R2 0.105 0.456 0.608 0.313 0.324 0.332
Notes: The dependent variable is log hourly wages. Standard errors are in parentheses.
`FG' is a dummy for foreigners. `YSM' is the interaction between `FG' and years since migration. 'Region' is
a set of 27 dummy variables (nutse3) accounting for the region of the country the establishment is located in;
'Industry' is a set of 211 dummy variables accounting for the industry of the establishment at the 3 digit level
(cae rev2.1); 'Occupation' is a set of 110 dummy variables accounting for the occupation of the individual at the
3 digit level (cnp94).
FG measures the wage gap and YSM the wage catch up. Sorting into regions, sectors and occupations explains
half of the wage gap between natives and immigrants. Immigrants wages grow at a rate of approximately
1 percentage point faster than natives. The catch up is not correlated to immigrants moving industries or
occupations. Estimations with and without individual heterogeneity are similar and show that the result is not
driven by selection.
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009.
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Table 3: Immigrant Wage Catch up by Origin Group
East.Eur. Brazil Africa East.Eur. Brazil Africa
(1) (1) (1) (4) (4) (4)
FG -0.377 -0.314 -0.346
(0.0016) (0.0024) (0.0024)
YSM 0.010 0.020 0.006 0.013 0.011 0.003
(0.0004) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0007) (0.0007)
Age (quartic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes
N 7,395,761 7,334,379 7,319,209 7,395,761 7,334,379 7,319,209
R2 0.100 0.148 0.096 0.315 0.315 0.315
Notes: The dependent variable is log hourly wages. Standard errors are in parentheses.
See table 2 for the denitions of the variables used.
The wage gap upon entry is highest for immigrants from Eastern Europe and lowest for Brazilians. The wage catch
up rate accounting for individual xed eects is above 1 percentage point for Brazilians and Eastern Europeans
but immigrants from Africa lag substantially behind.
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009.
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Table 4: Job Mobility
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
FG 0.211 0.191 0.117 0.083 0.080
(0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013) (0.0013)
YSM -0.021 -0.017 -0.010 -0.008 -0.007
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003)
Age -0.036 -0.022 -0.020 -0.019
(0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011) (0.0011)
Quartic in Age Yes Yes Yes Yes
Tenure -0.023 -0.019 -0.019
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)
Cubic in Tenure Yes Yes Yes
Hourly wage -0.001 -0.001 -0.001
(0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00005)
Region Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes
Occupation Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Cst 0.071 0.582 0.400 0.368 0.389
N 5,731,442 5,731,442 5,731,442 5,731,442 5,731,442
R2 0.010 0.011 0.049 0.081 0.082
Notes: The dependent variable is 1 if the worker will be working in a dierent rm next period, 0
if he stays with the same employer. Standard errors are in parentheses.
See table 2 for the denitions of the variables used.
The probability of changing employers is higher for immigrants than for natives. This probability
declines with years spent in the labour market.
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009.
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Table 5: Immigrant Wage Catch-up and Firm Fixed Eects
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
YSM 0.010 0.010 0.009 0.006 0.006
(0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
Age (quartic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region Yes Yes
Industry Yes Yes
Occupation Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes
N 7,543,209 7,543,209 7,543,209 7,543,209 7,543,209
R2 0.313 0.324 0.332 0.945 0.945
Notes: The dependent variable is log hourly wages. Standard errors are in parentheses.
See table 2 for the denitions of the variables used.
These regressions control for rm xed eects in the wage catch-up estimations. Comparing the
estimates for  in this table and table 2 shows that the coecient decreases from 1ppt to 0.6ppt,
or from 0.9 to 0.6ppt when controlling also for occupations. Changing rms accounts for a third
of the immigrant wage catch-up.
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009.
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Table 6: Immigrant Wage Catch-up and Firm Fixed Eects by Origin Group
East.Eur. East.Eur. Brazil Brazil Africa Africa
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
YSM 0.009 0.008 0.006 0.006 -0.001 -0.001
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004) (0.0004)
Age (quartic) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region
Industry
Occupation Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Individual FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Firm FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 7,395,761 7,395,761 7,334,379 7,334,379 7,319,209 7,319,209
R2 0.945 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946 0.946
Notes: The dependent variable is log hourly wages. Standard errors are in parentheses.
See table 2 for the denitions of the variables used.
Comparing the estimates in this table to those in table 3, the estimated  decreases from 1.3ppt to 0.9ppt for
Eastern Europeans and from 1.1ppt to 0.8ppt for Brazilians. A third of the wage catch-up occurs when changing
rms for these two groups. All of the wage catch-up for immigrants from Africa occurs when changing rms as
the estimated  is close to 0 in this estimation.
Source: Quadros de Pessoal, 2002-2009.
4
6
Table 7: The Variance of the
Wage Growth
FG 0.0072 0.0056
(0.0009) (0.0022)
EXP -0.0025 -0.0026
(0.0009) (0.0002)
YSM 0.0004
(0.0005)
Year FE Yes Yes
N 56 56
R2 0.808 0.807
Notes: The dependent variable is the
variance of the residual estimated from
equation (4) for a origin-cohort at
each calendar year. `FG' is a dummy
for foreigners.`EXP' are the years
of experience in the labour market
and `YSM' is the interaction between
`FG' and `FG'. Standard errors are in
parentheses.
In line with the model, the variance
of the wage growth is higher for
immigrants than for natives and both
decrease over time.
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Table 8: Competing Theories of the Distribution of Wages
Learning Model Search Model Human Capital Model
Basic Set up Employer learning with
complementarities be-
tween worker and rm
type
On-the-job-search Human capital accumula-
tion with complementari-
ties between worker and
rm type
Immigrants and Natives Higher initial uncertainty
about immigrant produc-
tivity
Lower initial search capi-
tal for immigrants
Lower initial human capi-
tal for immigrants
Immigrants and Natives
over Time
Immigrants accumulate
search capital faster than
natives
Immigrants accumulate
human capital faster than
natives
Other Features Firms value certainty over
the worker's productivity
Decreasing returns to hu-
man capital accumulation
Stylized Facts
Immigrant wage catch up
X X X
High but decreasing job
mobility for immigrants X X X
Switching rms accounts
for part of the catch up X X X
Variance of wages in-
creases over time X X if heterogeneous accumulation
of human capital
Variance of the wage
growth decreases over
time
X X if heterogeneous accumulation
of human capital
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